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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CAROLN MOORE CAINE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
GEORGE ECCLES CAINE,
Defendant and Respondent.

I

Case No.
12309

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATE.MENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action filed by Carolyn Moore
Caine, plaintiff and appellant, against George Eccles
Caine, defendant and respondent, who has cross-appealed under Rule 74 ( b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The District Court entered a decree of divorce in
favor of plaintiff, Carolyn Moore Caine, awarded ali-
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many and child support to her and awarded property to
the parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APlJEAL
Appellant asks that the judgment of the lower
court be modified by awarding additional property to
her. Respondent asks that the judgment of the lower
court be modified by striking the award of certain property to plaintiff and appellant.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
Defendant and respondent George Eccles Caine
supplements the appellant's statement of facts with those
facts relevant to his statement of points on cross-appeal.
Plaintiff and defendant had been married for 24
years. (R-98) They have two minor children and one
who has attained her majority. (R-49)
Immediately before the marriage the plaintiff was
supporting herself as a social worker in San Francisco.
(R-125) Except for a few items of furniture plaintiff
did not bring any property into this marriage. (R-14)
The plaintiff worked part of the time during the first
two years of this marriage while defendant completed
his education and commenced his employment in the
banking profession. (R-125, 127) Plaintiff attended
two colleges before the marriage and one after the mar·
riage. (R-124) She has the equivalent of one or two ',
years of college. (R-124) During the marriage the
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plaintiff worked for several service organizations as a
volunteer. (R-103) Presently, plaintiff enjoys good
health and intends to keep active. (R-102-104)
Defendant brought $10,000 in bonds into this marriage. (R-126) The bonds were a gift from his mother.
(R-132) In 1951 he constructed a two-level, four bedroom family home at 2552 East 1700 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah. (R-131) He obtained the $10,000 down
payment by cashing in the bonds he brought into the
marriage. (R-132)
With the assistance of substantial gifts from his
mother the defendant accumulated the following property and debts during their marriage:

Value

Property
Home
Cabin
Stock
Boats
Furniture
Automobile

$15,000.00
13,500.00
6,914.00
1,250.00
2,500.00
500.00

Debts to First Security
State Bank

$39,664.00
$20,400.00
$19,264.00

Net

(R-69)

Before and during the marriage defendant's mother
had a substantial estate. (R-139, 140} She desired to
pass as much of her estate as possible to her children and
grandchildren. (R-139, 140) She intended to use the
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maximum gift tax exclusion and to minimize the fed.
eral estate tax. (R-139, 140) During the marriage she
made gifts to plaintiff, defendant, her other children and
grandchildren. ( R-33, 132-141) She admonished the
donees that the property she gave them should be preserved and transferred to her grandchildren. (R-139,
141)

During their marriage the plaintiff was not concerned about their estate or income except when informed they were short of funds. (R-146, 147, 154)
Plaintiff admitted that she required a minimum of
$697.60 per month for her and her children's support.
(R-115, 116) During the year 1969 plaintiff's expenditures, which included expenditures for the support of
the three children and the defendant until he left the
home in July, 1969, totaled $13,722.75. Subtracting her
expenditures which did not continue after 1969 or this
divorce, her expenditures for her and her children's sup·
port totaled $11,694.85. After the defendant left the
home his living expenses plus amortization of the debt
to First Security State Bank were $13,561.76. (Ex. 3·
D) That total does not include the additional expenses
he incurred for taxes, costs and attorney's fees as a re·
sult of the divorce action and decree.
The District Court awarded plaintiff alimony in
the amount of $400.00 per month. (R-36) She stipu·
lated that the amount of alimony was reasonable. (R31) She was awarded child support in the amount of
$200.00 per month for each minor child. (R-55) The
4

child who has reached her majority has a substantial
estate which will adequately provide for her support.
(R-34)

'l'he decree provided that the plaintiff have the
following annual income from the following sources to
cover the amount required to support her and the minor
children which is $8,400 to $11,694.85 per year:
Alimony
Child Support
Bryant Estate
Bond Income
Amalgamated Sugar
Pet, Inc.
Cement
Eccles Investment
Interest

$ 4,800.00
4,800.00
1,451.00
148.74
641.24
451.80
164.80
3,965.00
18.51

Total Income
(R-29-35 and 43-47)

$16,405.09

The court awarded plaintiff property which has a
total value of $244,763.37. Included in the total property awarded to plaintiff are the following shares of
stock which were owned by defendant as the result of
gifts from his mother:

Name
Pet, Inc.
Kaiser Cement
Amalgamated Sugar
Co. Deb.

No. Shares

Value

378
201

$10,536.75
3,391.87
9,000.00
$22,928.62

Total Value

5

The property which the defendant received as a
gift from his mother which was awarded to the plaintiff
produces the following annual income:

Name
Pet, Inc.
Kaiser Cement
Amalgamated Sugar
Co. Deb.
Total Income

No. Share8

Income

378
301

$ 415.80
160.80
641.24
$1,217.84

Plaintiff will receive the shares of Pet, Inc., Kaiser
Cement and Amalagamated Sugar Debentures and hold
them with a tax basis of their market value at the time of
transfer of the shares to her. In other words, defendant
has to pay the capital gains tax on the increase in their
basis at the time of transfer. U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65,
8 L.Ed.2d 335 ( 1962).
The decree awarded plaintiff 42 percent of the
property defendant accumulated by his efforts during
the marriage. ( R-145) Considering a division of property the defendant accumulated by his efforts during
the marriage, the defendant received a net debt of
$6,400.00 plus the indebtedness he incurred under the
decree for his wife's attorney's fees in the sum of $2,500,
for taxes and for other costs.
The property defendant's mother gave him is a
business advantage to him. (R-135) His ownership of
that property perpetuates his family's control of firms
that they caused to successfully grow. His family's suc-
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cessful record warrants a continuation of their control.
(R-135)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY
AWARDED PLAINTIFF SHARES OF PET,
INC., KAISER CEMENT AND AMALGAMATED SUGAR DEBENTURES BECAUSE (A)
SAID PROPERTY WAS A GIFT TO DEFENDANT FRO.M DEFENDANT'S MOTHER; (B)
THE INCOME OF PLAINTIFF WITHOUT
SAID PROPERTY AND INCOME THEREFROM IS SUBSTANTIALLY IN EXCESS OF
THE AMOUNT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN
PLAINTIFF IN HER STANDARD OF LIVING AND (C) THE PLAINTIFF WILL ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL ESTATE WITHOUT
SAID PROPERTY.
The parties stipulated that defendant's mother
transferred securities as a gift to the parties during their
marriage. Plaintiff received securities from defendant's
mother with a value of $181,334.75. In 1969, her income
from the gifts was $3,965.00. She would not have received the gifts from defendant's mother if she had not
married the defendant. On the other hand, the defendant would have received substantial gifts from his
mother if he had not married the plaintiff.
'Vhen he received the gifts from his mother he was
7

admonished that he should preserve his family's estate.
His mother implicitly intended that defendant have control of the disposition of the family estate. Furthermore,
the gifts to defendant were a business advantage to the
defendant and his family. They perpetuated control of
firms his family caused to become successful. Under the
the control of his family they will continue to be successful.
The District Court abused its discretion by providing in the decree that defendant's shares of Pet, Inc.,
Kaiser Cement and Amalgamated Debentures be awarded to plaintiff. This court has recognized the rule that
property which has been acquired by one spouse by gift
is not included within the marital estate. It should not be
awarded to the other spouse in a decree of divorce unless a "special equity" exists. This court recognized the
rule in Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d
928 ( 1968) and in Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P.
292 ( 1928) . In both of those decisions this court implied that a "special equity" does not exist in this case.
Decisions in support of defendant's contention can be
found in other jurisdictions.
In McGaughy v. McGaughy, (Ill.) 102 N.E.2d
806 ( 1952) the court expressed the rule as follows:
"Where the wife makes no contribution to the
acquiring of real estate, a conveyance to her upon
a divorce is not justified, except only in cases of
special equity."
Additionally, the rule was followed in Y eonen v. Yeonen, (Ill.) 117 N.E.2d 98 (1954) and Mazique v. Ma-
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zique, ( D.C.) 206 Atl.2d 577 ( 1965). In Idaho the rule
is codified at Idaho Code § 32-903. California and Arizona have a similar statute.
No "special equity" existed for awarding plaintiff
the property defendant's mother gave to defendant. The
decree awarded plaintiff an unearned fortune and handsome income without the award of defendant's stock and
debentures. The plaintiff would continue to have an income substantially in excess of her requirements in maintaining her standard of living. She would have an estate
which is not the result of her efforts and which she would
not have had but for her marriage to defendant. If
plaintiff remarries, she would have income in the sum of
$10,238.53 per year. If she does not remarry after the
children reach their majority she would have income in
the amount of $10,238.53 per year. Regardless of remarriage her estate would have a value of $219,334.75.
The guidelines for dividing property set forth by
this court in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 255
(1937), and MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573,
236 P .2d 1066 ( 1951) as well as the rule that property
acquired by gift is not in the marital estate compels the
conclusion that the District Court abused its discretion.
POINT II
EXCEPT FOR THE AWARD TO PLAINTIFF OF DEFENDANT'S SHARES IN PET,
INC., KAISER CEMENT AND AMALGAMATED SUGAR CO. DEBENTURES, THE DIVI9

SION OF PROPERTY IN THE DECREE YVAS
WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE DIS.
TRICT COURT JUDGE AND SHOULD NOT
BE MODIFIED.

In Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d •
928 ( 1968), thi.s court recently stated the wide discretion the trial judge has in making a division of property
in an action for divorce. The court stated:

"The problem of a division of property between :
parties to divorce proceedings has been before '
this court on numerous occasions. Section 30-3-5.
U.C.A. 1953, provides that when a decree of I
divorce is made the court may make such orders i
in relation to property as may be equitable. The
decisions of this court have not announced a fixed
rule or formula for f)he division of property, but
the rule announced in practically all of the cases
is to the effect that the trial court has wide dis·
cretion in these matters, and the judgment of the
trial court will not be disturbed unless the record
shows that there has been an abuse of discretion
on the part of the court." (Emphasis added)
The District Court did not abuse its discretion because it did not award defendant's shares of Utah Con·
struction Company to plaintiff. Plaintiff will have an
estate and income which is substantially in excess of her
needs and which conforms to her standard of living dur·
ing the marriage. The court would have erred if it had
awarded the shares of Utah Construction as requested
by plaintiff because the defendant received those shares
from his mother by gift. Those shares were defendant's
separate property and should not be awarded to plain·
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tiff unless a "special equity" exists. There is no special
equity in this case. If the court had awarded one-third
of defendant's shares of Utah Construction it would
have been manifestly unjust because of the consequences
of such an award.
A consequence of an award of Utah Construction
Company shares to plaintiff is the tax impact. It
would result in a capital gains tax on defendant in the
approximate sum of $30,000 because defendant's basis
is $.75 per share and the present market value is approximately $70.00 per share. U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S.
65, 8L.Ed.2d 335 ( 1962). The plaintiff would hold the
shares at the $70.00 basis. She would receive an estate
with a value of $355,109.37 and she would have an annual income of $17,801.96. On the other hand, the defendant would have current indebtedness in the sum of
$50,400.00 plus attorney's fees, other coli ts and miscellaneous indebtedness he assumed as a result of the divorce. He would have an annual income before taxes
with which to pay his indebtedness of $22,478.00. That
annual income would be reduced because he would be
forced to liquidate some of his assets to meet his current
obligations. In liquidating his assets he would encounter
this same capital gains tax problem because the securities he received from his mother have a low tax basis. He
would probably have to liquidate one-half of his remaining shares of Utah Construction which his mother gave
tu him with her admonition and with its business advantage. The end result would be that plaintiff would receive one-third of defendant's shares in Utah Construe-
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tion and defendant would have the same number of
shares of Utah Construction in his estate. Therefore
'
plaintiff would have an estate of $355,109.37 and defendant would have an estate of approximately $406,000.00. The plaintiff would have an income of $17,801.96
and the defendant would have an income of approximately $21,000.00.
Notwithstanding this court's decisions which hold
that there is not a fixed rule or formula for dividing
property, the plaintiff contends that she should receive
one-third of plaintiff's property notwithstanding its
source. However, the impact of her request makes it a
request for approximately one-half.
Another unreasonable request of plaintiff is that
this court order defendant to pay her for dividends she
has received and used prior to the decree. Equity dictates that she cannot expect the defendant to make up
to her that which she has already been paid and apparently spent. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff
did not complain that defendant did not fully comply
with the temporary order of support to which she stipulated. The District Judge was fully advised of this circumstance and he correctly exercised his discretion in ref using plaintiff's request for an additional $100.00 per
month for the months of August to and including December, 1970.
CONCLUSION
Defendant and respondent, George Eccles Caine,
respectfully prays that this court modify the decree of
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August 28, 1970, by striking therefrom the award of
defendant's shares of Pet, Inc., Kaiser Cement and
Amalgamated Sugar Debentures to plaintiff. Other
than the modification of the decree requested by defendant and respondent, this court should affirm the provisions in the decree of divorce.
Respectfully submitted,
L. Ridd Larson
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
400 Deseret Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

13

